Pipeline Safety

On July 30 of this year, the issue of pipeline safety broke onto the Arizona scene when the Kinder Morgan pipeline, burst in Tucson, sending more than 10,000 gallons of liquid gas through the soil, 50 feet into the air and eventually onto several nearby homes. The run-off from this accident flowed down into a nearby arroyo. Very few Arizonans had ever even heard of Kinder Morgan and even fewer people were aware of where the Kinder Morgan pipelines actually lie in the ground – even those who inhabited homes directly atop or nearby the pipeline.

In the immediate aftermath of the Kinder Morgan burst, most Arizonans and public officials were concerned with the initial task of getting the pipeline repaired and restoring full delivery of gasoline to the Valley, where a gasoline panic had developed and where gas prices had soared to in some cases more than 4 dollars per gallon.

But later the public began to explore more deeply the question of what happened, and what could be done to prevent another burst.

Questions were naturally posed about how Arizona inspects the pipeline, and whether Kinder Morgan had neglected necessary maintenance of the pipeline. Unfortunately, the answers to these questions have been largely disquieting. The answers to the questions were new to the public at large, but they have been a source of ongoing concern at the Corporation Commission, which is tasked with the responsibility of inspecting interstate liquid and natural gas pipelines as an agent of the federal Office of Pipeline Safety.

Under the work plan that is approved as a part of the agency agreement between the ACC and OPS, state inspectors are limited in the amount of time they are permitted to spend inspecting the KM and other pipelines. In the case of KM, our inspectors are allowed to spend only 10 workdays on the line. This is woefully inadequate for an effective inspection to be done on a pipeline that is hundreds of miles long. Every year our inspectors request of OPS to be allowed to spend more time on the line and every year they are denied permission.

Between the years 1996 and 2003, ACC’s Division of Pipeline Safety inspected the 50 year old KM pipeline six times; in every instance they found evidence of general corrosion and in some cases warned that KM had failed to take preventative maintenance steps. We have in some cases specifically warned that this lack of maintenance could result in loss of life or property.

Unfortunately, no enforcement authority exists in the hands of the agency with the expertise and the incentive to investigate the pipelines – the ACC. Only the federal OPS can enforce a violation. Federal OPS has in the past taken up to 10 years to close out notices of probable non-compliance written by Arizona inspectors, and rarely issues fines larger than $5,000. This needs to change. OPS should and must close cases more quickly, and issue real fines with teeth. If it cannot, enforcement power should be given over to the states.

In the aftermath of the Kinder Morgan pipeline burst, the federal OPS decided to allow Kinder Morgan to conduct the only metallurgical test to determine what caused the rupture. Believing this test would not carry with it the confidence of the people of Arizona, I persuaded OPS to allow us to do an independent test of what caused the pipeline to rupture. The stretch of pipe that burst has now been sent to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, where it is undergoing testing overseen by OPS and ACC officials. I have asked Sen. John McCain to introduce legislation that would require an independent test – one not overseen and directed by the pipeline companies – in the case of every major pipeline accident or rupture.

Recently, the ACC has had fruitful discussions with Stacey Gerard at OPS who has promised to undertake a joint effort to reform the communications policy of the OPS to allow states greater latitude to release to the public information about safety inspections and accident investigations. Along with Commissioner Bill Mundell, I am in the process of drafting recommendations for a new communications policy that will allow for greater flexibility in the release of documents and communication with and between local officials.